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This Note addresses the intersection of customary and statutory land law 
in the land tenure policy of Ghana. It argues that improving the current 
land tenure policy demands integration of customary land law and 
customary authorities into the statutory system. After describing why 
and how customary property practices are central to the economic 
viability of any property system, the Note gives a brief overview of 
Ghana’s customary and statutory land law. The Note concludes with 
specific policy suggestions about how Ghana could better draw on the 
strength of its customary land sector. 
INTRODUCTION 
Land makes up nearly three quarters of the wealth of developing 
countries,1 and development leaders,2 businesspeople,3 and academics4 
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1. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 86 (2000). 
2. The World Bank’s 2002 development report was clear in its support for property rights 
as a prerequisite for economic growth. See THE WORLD BANK, BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR 
MARKETS 34-38 (2002) (discussing land rights). UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has also 
stated his belief that “without rules governing contracts and property rights; without 
confidence based on the rule of law; without trust and transparency – there could be no well-
functioning markets.” United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, Address Before the 
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have long argued that well-crafted property rights are necessary to unlock 
the value of that land and encourage economic development. Though some 
celebrate the notion that property rights are constantly evolving towards 
efficiency,5 scholars are increasingly recognizing that the emergence of 
efficient, enforceable property rights is not inevitable, especially in the 
developing world.6 
Recent high-profile work on property rights has sparked renewed 
popular interest in legal solutions to land-based development issues,7 but 
unfortunately that interest has often been “directed at the viability in 
emerging market societies of these ideas, relationships, and institutions as 
transplanted from Western industrial democracies, not at unearthing their 
roots and nurturing those roots within the local communities.”8 Across 
Africa, for example, attempts to craft property rights have largely been 
state-driven, top-down programs which attempt to replace customary 
forms of land ownership with Western-style property practices such as 
formal land title registration.9 Programs attempting to implement these 
reforms have largely failed. The present wave of land tenure reform in 
Africa is uniquely placed to learn from these mistakes and craft a new and 
more development-friendly approach to land tenure policy.10 
This Note argues that rather than attempting to undermine norms 
                                                          
United States Chamber of Commerce (June 10, 1999). 
3.  E.g., O. Lee Reed, Law, the Rule of Law, and Property: A Foundation for the Private Market 
and Business Study, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 441, 446 (2001). 
4. E.g., YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989). 
5. See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 
(1967) (arguing that legal rules surrounding property evolve to reach efficient outcomes); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. 
LEGAL. STUD. S331, S331 (2002) (refining Demsetz’s thesis to allow for the impact of social 
norms and interest group politics); Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 181 (2003) (exploring the impact of politics on “the conventional and 
optimistic story . . . that the emergence of property rights in personal and real property has 
been a story of evolutionary success.”). 
6. See, e.g., Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third 
World Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 YALE L. J. 996, 999 (2006). 
7. See generally DE SOTO, supra note 1; HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH (1990) 
(arguing that registration of extralegal property can spark economic development); see also 
Jonathan Manders, Note, Sequencing Property Rights in the Context of Development: A Critique of 
the Writings of Hernando de Soto, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 177 (2005) (arguing that de Soto over-
emphasizes the existence of property rights in achieving development goals and fails to 
address when those rights should be established, how quickly, and by whom); Jane Kaufman 
Winn, How to Make Poor Countries Rich and Enrich Our Poor, 77 IOWA L. REV. 899, 922 (1992) 
(reviewing HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, and arguing that law and development 
solutions were not culturally-attuned and were thus rejected). 
8. Maxwell O. Chibundu, Law in Development: On Tapping, Gourding and Serving Palm-
Wine, 29 CASE W. RES. J INT’L L. 167, 207 (1997). 
9. KLAUS DEININGER, WORLD BANK, LAND POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY 
REDUCTION 39 (2003); Kathryn Firmin-Sellers & Patrick Sellers, Expected Failures and 
Unexpected Successes of Land Titling in Africa, 27 WORLD DEV. 1115 (1999). 
10.  Camilla Toulmin & Julian Quan,  Evolving Land Rights, Policy and Tenure in Sub-saharan 
Africa, in EVOLVING LAND RIGHTS, POLICY AND TENURE IN AFRICA 1, 2 (Camilla Toulmin & 
Julian Quan eds., 2000). 
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about property, successful land tenure reform must use those norms as the 
basis for an integrated property system that combines custom and statute. 
Building from theory and using Ghana as a case study, the Note seeks to 
address why and how customary land practices must be incorporated into 
formal land law in order for land tenure reforms to promote efficient and 
equitable economic growth. In doing so, it attempts to build a bridge 
between the theoretical underpinnings of property reform, exemplified by 
the New Institutional Economics approach described in Part I, and the 
practical issues of land administration in developing countries. 
Reconciliation of customary and statutory property law in Africa has 
never been more important, nor more difficult, than it is now. Countries 
across Africa are currently struggling to create rational, efficient land 
policies that merge modern statutory law with the traditional customary 
law that governs many people’s day-to-day lives.11 The costs of failure, of 
the divergence between formality and reality, can be alarming. The 
government bulldozers that destroyed thousands of homes and businesses 
throughout Zimbabwe in the summer of 2005 as part of President Robert 
Mugabe’s Operation Drive Out Trash gave a particularly vivid 
representation of this battle.12 Those homes, like the shanties, kiosks and 
unofficial markets that make up a large share of Africa’s “informal” 
economy, existed outside of Zimbabwe’s formal law. This made them, in 
Mugabe’s vision, “trash.” Although some scholars have begun to address 
the issue of how property rights transition from customary or Marxist 
systems into private capitalist systems,13 few have taken on the difficult 
and relatively unglamorous task of proposing feasible, country-specific 
solutions for how custom and informal rights can be integrated with 
statute into a nationwide economy. At best, failure to turn theory into 
practice deprives the informal sector and hence the economy of growth 
opportunities. At worst, it leads to destructive conflicts like Operation 
Drive Out Trash. 
Ghana is not as extreme an example as Zimbabwe. But, like most sub-
Saharan African nations, it depends on land as the basis of its economy 
while simultaneously struggling to solve land-related problems and 
                                                          
11. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN LUND, WAITING FOR THE RURAL CODE: PERSPECTIVES ON A LAND 
TENURE REFORM IN NIGER (1993); MICHAEL MORTIMORE, HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF LAND 
TENURE AND ADMINISTRATION IN WEST AFRICA (1997); ROSE MWEBAZA, HOW TO INTEGRATE 
STATUTORY AND CUSTOMARY TENURE: THE UGANDA CASE (1999); LUNGISILE NTSEBEZA, LAND 
TENURE REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN EXAMPLE FROM THE EASTERN CAPE PROVINCE (1999). 
12. Michael Wines, Zimbabawe Police Resume Drive to Raze Slums, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2005, 
at A3; Editorial: Truth Telling on Zimbabwe, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2005, at A16; see also Solomon J. 
Greene, Staged Cities: Mega-events, Slum Clearance, and Global Capital, 6 YALE H.R. & DEV. L. J. 
161 (2003) (examining slum clearance programs aimed at improving the profile of cities 
hosting major events). 
13. See Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S359 (2002); 
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 678 (1998). 
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reconcile a legal system that is divided between custom and statute.14 Land 
is Ghana’s single most valuable asset and the foundation of the national 
resource base.15 Agriculture accounts for more than sixty percent of the 
country’s jobs.16 Despite its economic importance, however, the land sector 
in Ghana is plagued with a number of major problems.17 The National 
Land Policy (NLP) of Ghana, published in June 1999 after years of broad 
consultation, provides a good overview of the nature and scope of the 
obstacles to land sector development, including indeterminate boundaries, 
weak land administration, and inadequate land tenure security.18 These 
problems, and the importance of land itself, are representative of problems 
across the countryside. 
Land sector problems are particularly acute in urban and peri-urban 
areas, where the growing population has increased social and economic 
demand for land.19 Rather than being able to profit from rising land values, 
some Ghanaians have found their livelihoods sold out from under them by 
unscrupulous chiefs or government administrators. Lacking the power to 
claim just compensation, many Ghanaians are doomed to landlessness.20 In 
peri-urban Kumasi, not only are instances of “rough sleeping” (on 
verandahs, kiosks, or pavements) increasingly common—one in six men 
and women do so—but overcrowding is also on the rise, with some 
villages averaging six to twelve people per room.21 The housing crunch has 
also led to occasional hostility between displaced landowners and the 
chiefs and developers they perceive to be benefiting from their calamity.22 
Recent studies report that customary ownership rights in rural areas, too, 
are becoming less secure as commercial transactions and development 
increase.23 The homelessness, poverty, and violence springing from these 
property failures demonstrate that land tenure security is a problem not 
just of economic development, but of human rights. 
Government interventions meant to address these problems have 
sometimes worsened them.24 Well-intentioned but ill-considered land 
                                                          
14. LENNOX KWAME AGBOSU, LAND LAW IN GHANA: CONTRADICTION BETWEEN ANGLO-
AMERICAN AND CUSTOMARY CONCEPTIONS OF TENURE AND PRACTICES 1-3 (Land Tenure Ctr., 
Working Paper No. 33, 2000). 
15. MINISTRY OF LANDS AND FORESTRY, REPUBLIC OF GHANA, NATIONAL LAND POLICY 1 
(1999) [hereinafter NATIONAL LAND POLICY]. 
16. AGBOSU, supra note 14, at 2. 
17. NATIONAL LAND POLICY, supra note 15, at 3-4. 
18. Id. 
19. CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT, CORRUPTION AND OTHER CONSTRAINTS 
ON THE LAND MARKET AND LAND ADMINISTRATION IN GHANA: A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION 
10 (2000). 
20. R. KASIM KASANGA & NII ASHIE KOTEY, LAND MANAGEMENT IN GHANA: BUILDING ON 
TRADITION AND MODERNITY 18 (2001). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. 1 GEORGE SARPONG, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PARTICIPATORY PLANNING: FINAL 
REPORT ON LEGAL ASPECTS OF LAND TENURE, PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 13 (1999). 
24. DAVID TABACHNICK, LIBERAL CONTRACTS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTS AND COMMON 
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reforms can exacerbate the division between custom and statutory law, 
leaving vulnerable groups such as women with less protection than they 
had under customary systems.25 The government’s acquisition of vast 
tracts of land in high-pressure urban areas only compounds the problem, 
especially when that land is cleared and then left unused. Shanties and 
kiosks begin reappearing almost overnight, stubbornly asserting 
customary claims in the face of government bulldozers. 
Moreover, competition for land rights has led to a rash of land 
disputes,26 draining time and resources away from land development. The 
wave of land-related litigation has completely overwhelmed the 
government bodies responsible for dealing with property disputes. Formal 
land courts are themselves hampered by poor case management, 
corruption, staff shortages, and antiquated procedures such as recording of 
evidence by the judge in long hand.27 Customary courts, which are still 
popular and powerful, offer a potential alternative to the state courts, but 
they lack state power to compel attendance or enforce decisions.28 
This Note argues that many of these problems can be solved by better 
integrating customary law and customary authorities into the statutory 
system. Part I introduces the theoretical analysis, using New Institutional 
Economics as a framework to argue that the economic success of a property 
system is dependent on the degree to which it integrates social norms and 
customary law. Parts II and III then flesh out the theory by describing the 
various statutory and customary land rights which prevail in Ghana. 
Understanding of these rights is an essential predicate to the formulation of 
feasible policy proposals. Part II describes the statutory land law of Ghana, 
which, like that of most African nations, is heavily influenced by 
colonialism. Part III briefly describes the other half of Ghana’s dual 
property system: customary property law and its attendant rights and 
structures. Finally, Parts IV and V translate the first three Parts into specific 
policy prescriptions for Ghana, suggesting, in Part IV, practical ways to 
integrate legal systems, and, in Part V, methods of integrating legal 
authorities such as chiefs into the formal system. 
In keeping with the argument of this Note that land tenure policy must 
be country-specific and attentive to practical realities, these policy solutions 
are meant to be both flexible and specific to Ghana itself. They certainly do 
not comprise a one-size-fits-all land reform for all of Africa. Nonetheless, it 
is hoped that they can be valuable both to academics and to government 
officials contemplating land reform. 
                                                          
PROPERTY: AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES 13 (1998) (“[T]he greatest source for unpredictable 
interference with economic/social relationships may come not from the breakdown of a local, 
informal world of relationship networks, but externally from the state.”). 
25. GEORGE BENNEH ET AL., WOMEN’S ACCESS TO AGRICULTURAL LAND IN THE HOUSEHOLD: 
A CASE STUDY OF THREE SELECTED DISTRICTS IN GHANA 4 (1995). 
26. 1 SARPONG, supra note 23, at 11. 
27. KASANGA & KOTEY, supra note 20, at 10; 1 SARPONG, supra note 23, at 57. 
28. A. KODZO PAAKU KLUDZE, CHIEFTAINCY IN GHANA 57-58 (2000); see infra Part V.C. 
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 I.  THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ROOTS OF PROPERTY 
This Note argues that land-based economic growth in developing 
countries like Ghana depends on the successful integration of statutory and 
customary land law.29 In other words, the two foundations of property—as 
formal law and as a social agreement—must be closely aligned in order for 
property to play a role in enhancing economic efficiency.30 In support of 
that practical argument, and to give theoretical justification to the policy 
prescriptions in Parts IV and V, this Part draws on New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) theory, which recognizes the value of both formal and 
informal institutions and applies a transaction costs-based approach to 
property rights and social norms.31 By emphasizing practice as well as law, 
and taking a broad view of the institutions that make up an economy, NIE 
helps frame and explain the problems which the rest of this Note seeks to 
address.  
This Part briefly explores two major characteristics of property rights 
institutions: First, that property rights play a role as an economizing 
institution, but second, and equally crucial, that they are also created by 
and dependent on social norms. Those two arguments can be synthesized 
into a third: The ability of formal property rights to provide economic 
benefits is largely dependent on how well those rights build on pre-
existing custom. In other words, two foundations of property—as formal 
law and as a social agreement—must be closely aligned in order for 
property to play a role in enhancing economic efficiency.32 Well-drafted 
property laws do more than simply set down clear regulations for people 
to follow and rules for them to respect. They build on social 
understandings already in place. When they do not, the “transaction costs” 
of legal change can threaten the success of reform. Losing touch with 
realities of property practice can be particularly costly in societies such as 
Ghana where practice diverges significantly from written law.33 
 
                                                          
29. See Jean Ensminger, Changing Property Rights: Reconciling Formal and Informal Rights to 
Land in Africa, in THE FRONTIERS OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 165, 165 (John N. 
Drobak & John V.C. Nye eds., 1997); DE SOTO, supra note 1, at 172. 
30. Reed, supra note 3, at 441-42. 
31. My intention here is only to give a brief overview of the theory underlying property 
rights and development, not to advance the already substantial literature surrounding the 
theoretical economics of property rights development. For a more thorough discussion see 
Fitzpatrick, supra note 6. 
32. Reed, supra note 3, at 442. 
33. “Nowhere is this cleavage between textbook law and social reality more glaring than 
in the customary land law of Ghana.” Samuel K.B. Asante, Interest in the Customary Law of 
Ghana—A New Appraisal, 74 YALE L.J. 848, 849 (1964). Gray and Gray point to a specific 
example elsewhere in the commonwealth: “[I]t was, significantly, the conceptualization of 
property in terms of abstract right rather than empirical fact which, for two centuries, disabled 
the common law from recognizing the proprietary nature of Australian native title.” Kevin 
Gray & Susan Francis Gray, The Idea of Property in Law, in LAND LAW: THEMES AND 
PERSPECTIVES 15, 37 (John Dewar & Susan Bright eds., 1998). 
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A.   New Institutional Economics: Property Rights as Economic 
Institutions 
Ronald Coase gave initial foundation to the notion that property rights 
could positively affect economic outcomes and helped set the stage for 
institutional analysis. Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost illustrated the point 
that, given the assumptions of neoclassical economic analysis,34 a clear 
delineation of property rights would lead to an economically efficient 
allocation of resources. “[I]f market transactions were costless, all that 
matters (questions of equity apart) is that the rights of the various parties 
should be well-defined and the results of legal actions easy to forecast.”35 
But Coase himself recognized that transactions are costly; indeed, the 
neoclassical economy “only lives in the minds of economists but not on 
earth.”36 He warned: 
 
A better approach would seem to be to start our analysis with a 
situation approximating that which actually exists, to examine the 
effects of a proposed policy change and to attempt to decide 
whether the new situation would be, in total, better or worse than 
the original one. In this way, conclusions for policy would have 
some relevance to the actual situation.37 
Douglass North writes that Coase’s “most important message, one 
with profound implications for restructuring economic theory, is that when 
it is costly to transact, institutions matter.”38 Indeed, the major efficiency-
related contribution of institutions, and the most important economic 
reason for their existence, is a reduction in the transaction costs of 
exchange.39 
North writes that institutions are “the rules of the game in a society or, 
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction. . . . [They] are perfectly analogous to the rules of the game in a 
                                                          
34. THRÁINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 38 (1990) (“Implicit in 
the basic neoclassical model are two assumptions: that all valuable rights, including the right 
to airwaves, the space around us, and sunrays, are privately held; and that these rights are 
unattenuated by the state.”). 
35. Ronald Coase, Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 19 (1960). The theorem’s 
assumptions—no transaction costs and no importance attached to equity or distributions 
concerns—are essentially those of the neoclassical model. 
36. R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 714 (1992). 
See also Howard Stein, Institutional Theories and Structural Adjustment in Africa, in THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 109, 109 (John Harris et al. eds., 
1995); EGGERTSSON, supra note 34, at 96. 
37. Coase, supra note 35, at 43. 
38. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 12 (1990). 
39. Id. at 27 (“[M]easurement and enforcement costs are the sources of social, political and 
economic institutions.”). 
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competitive team sport.”40 Institutions are thus central to all human 
interaction and organization, and economists and other theorists have 
proposed appropriately broad frameworks to explain institutions’ nature 
and functions. New Institutional Economics (NIE) is the most successful of 
these theories.41 It suggests that institutions can reduce transaction costs by 
regularizing interactions and spreading knowledge through norms and 
other mechanisms. North argues that the “major role of institutions in a 
society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily 
efficient) structure to human interaction.”42 Property, specifically, is the 
institution most uniquely focused on reducing transaction costs.43 
B.  Social Norms, Transaction Costs and Property 
Not all cost-reducing institutions are created by the state. Informal 
property institutions like social norms and custom can perform an 
economizing function just as formal property institutions such as statutory 
law and government do.44 Indeed, property theorists have come to accept 
that community norms, operating independently of formal law, can lead to 
efficient resource allocation.45 Sometimes this means that “social” property 
institutions act to address market failures.46 A strongly held norm or 
custom of transparency in dealings in land, for example, “may render 
many economic transactions possible without a need to rely on elaborate 
and costly safeguards. In this, custom may contribute to economic 
efficiency.”47 Indeed, property conventions, norms, and customs are often 
more predictable and unchanging than statutory law itself,48 as the 
                                                          
40. Id. at 3-4. Compare to a similar definition proposed by Lin and Nugent: “[A]n 
institution is defined as a set of humanly devised behavioral rules that govern and shape the 
interactions of human beings, in part by helping them to form expectations of what other 
people will do. In so constraining behavior, institutions may be reflected in the appearance of 
certain behavioral regularities or norms.” Justin Yifu Lin & Jeffrey B. Nugent, Institutions and 
Economic Development, in 3 HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 2306-07 (J. Behrman & 
T.N. Srinivasan eds., 1995). 
41. See Philip M. Nichols, A Legal Theory of Emerging Economies, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 229, 239 
(1999) (“Across the variety of social sciences, the theoretical approach that possibly has the 
most currency is institutionalism.”). 
42. NORTH, supra note 38, at 6. 
43. DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A 
NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY 8 (1973). 
44. See generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991). 
45. See, e.g., JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 142-44 (1988); ELINOR 
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE 
ACTION (1990). 
46. Robert H. Bates, Social Dilemmas and Rational Individuals: An Assessment of the New 
Institutionalism, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 27, 
35 (John Harris et al. eds., 1995). 
47. Ekkehart Schlicht, On Custom, 159 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 178, 180 
(1993). 
48. See generally Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field 
as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1973) (arguing that semi-
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lurching changes throughout the history of Ghana’s own statutory land 
law demonstrate.49 Internalized norms are often followed even when their 
violation would go undetected by society,50 making formal policing less 
necessary and thus lowering enforcement costs.51 This suggests that 
transaction costs can be lowered not just by improvements in statute, or 
technology, but by trust and noting consistent behavior.52 In societies that 
do not have effective formal enforcement mechanisms, values such as trust 
and honor play an important economic role by filling the “enforcement 
gap.”53 It is thus common, when statutory law cannot meet the economic 
needs of the people, to turn to custom and other “institutions that act as 
alternatives to contract law.”54 In Ghana, where courts often cannot be 
relied on to enforce contracts, social relationships and norms take on an 
especially important role, just as they would in any society where state-run 
enforcement mechanisms do not adequately address enforcement costs. 
And besides aiding in enforcement, social norms can also help reduce 
search and measurement costs.55 Because bargaining and measurement 
costs are high, particularly in developing countries, most contracts are 
incompletely detailed,56 and thus informal agreements inevitably play a 
large role in their performance. Relying on these agreements when 
possible, rather than on costly formal institutions, minimizes the 
transaction costs associated with measurement and enforcement of 
contracts. 
The importance of this informality reinforces the notion that property 
is in essence a relationship, not an object or a written rule. It is “simply an 
abbreviated reference to a quantum of socially permissible power exercised 
in respect of a socially valued resource.”57 In a legal and philosophical 
                                                          
autonomous social norms mediate the impact of legal reform on social change). But see 
KATHRYN FIRMIN-SELLERS, THE TRANSFORMATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GOLD COAST: 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS APPLYING RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 17 (1996) (describing chiefs’ 
attempts to define and redefine property law in colonial and post-colonial Ghana); 
NEGOTIATING PROPERTY IN AFRICA (Kristine Juul & Christian Lund eds., 2002). 
49. See infra Part III. 
50. Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory, 3 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 99, 104 (1989). 
51. Jean-Phillippe Platteau, The Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights as Applied to Sub-Saharan 
Africa: A Critical Assessment, 27 DEV. & CHANGE 29, 76-77 (1996). 
52.  See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law and Society & Law and Economics—Common Ground, 
Irreconcilable Differences, New Directions: Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and 
Gratuitous Promises, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 567, 577-82 (arguing that trust relationships allow parties 
to achieve utility that would otherwise be blocked by transaction costs). 
53. Nichols, supra note 41, at 272-273. 
54. Id. at 273. 
55. Clifford Geertz’s seminal study of North African bazaars showed that traders in the 
bazaar lessen search and negotiation costs through a process of “clientalization,” or repeated 
face-to-face trading between the same buyer and seller. Clifford Geertz, The Bazaar Economy: 
Information and Search in Peasant Marketing, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 28 (1978); see also Richard A. 
Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law, 23 J. L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1980). 
56. See generally BARZEL, supra note 4 (describing costs of establishing perfectly accurate 
property rights). 
57. Gray & Gray, supra note 33, at 15; see also 2 THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY 
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sense, then, “property” does not refer to a physical object, but rather the 
rights to use it.58 This is why, in legal parlance, one does not own land but 
rather rights in land, and these rights exist not as against other pieces of 
land but as against other people. The strength of property rights obviously 
depends on their acceptance by others, and thus social norms play a crucial 
role in the creation and maintenance of property.59 Indeed, as Platteau has 
argued, “[t]he point is that, if property has no social legitimacy, it is no 
property because it lacks the basic ingredient of property, recognition by 
others.”60 Kevin and Susan Gray also point to the relational nature of 
property: “[T]he deep structure of property is not absolute, autonomous, 
and oppositional. It is, instead, delimited by a strong sense of community-
directed obligation, and is rooted in a contextual network of mutual 
constraint and social accommodation mediated by the agencies of the 
state.”61 
Understanding property as a set of social norms makes it clear how 
broadly those norms apply. At times they overlap with formal rules, at 
times they compete with them,62 and at other times they fill in gaps where 
formal rules do not or cannot reach. Social acceptance of property rights is 
thus of paramount importance not only in supposedly communal systems 
but also in systems that are relatively formal and give significant scope to 
“private” property rights.63 Even in systems which seem to be dominated 
by considerations of market efficiency, social norms play an enormous 
role.64 In such formalized systems, social convention may still serve as a 
kind of interpretive framework for deciding difficult property-related 
issues, such as in situations where the rule or law seems indeterminate.65 
Moreover, people often choose to rely on social agreements even when 
they are fully aware of the requirements of formal law.66 
                                                          
RIGHTS: SELECTED READINGS 3 (Svetozar Pejovich ed., 1997). 
58. Coase himself has written: “I explained in The Problem of Social Cost that what are 
traded in the market are not, as is often supposed by economists, physical entities but the 
rights to perform certain actions and the rights which individuals possess are established by 
the legal system.” Ronald Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, in NOBEL LECTURES IN 
ECONOMIC SCIENCE 11, 17 (Torsten Persson ed., 1997). 
59. Franz Benda-Beckmann & Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, A Functional Analysis of 
Property Rights, with Special Reference to Indonesia, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND OCEANIA 15, 36 
(Toon van Meijl & Franz von Benda-Beckmann eds., 1999). 
60. Platteau, supra note 51, at 46. 
61. Gray & Gray, supra note 33, at 41. 
62. See Shem Migot-Adholla et al., Indigenous Land Rights Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa: A 
Constraint on Productivity?, 5 WORLD BANK EC. REV. 155, 164 (1991). 
63. Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, 50 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 252, 303-04 (1991); David E. Ault & 
Gilbert L. Rutman, The Development of Individual Rights to Property in Tribal Africa, 22 J.L. & 
ECON. 163, 166 (1979). 
64. NORTH, supra note 38, at 36; see also JEAN ENSMINGER, MAKING A MARKET: THE 
INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF AN AFRICAN SOCIETY 154 (1992); KARL POLANYI, THE 
GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (1957). 
65. J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 320 (1996). 
66. See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 44. 
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C.  Intersection between Property Laws and Social Norms: The 
Transaction Costs of Legal Change 
Social norms play an even more important role in countries like Ghana, 
where formal property systems face special structural obstacles, such as the 
number of decision makers, the heterogeneity of their interests, their skills, 
and the framework for changing rules.67 Options for change are often also 
limited by a society’s administrative capabilities or knowledge base.68 
Perhaps the most important factor contributing to the persistence of 
inefficient property institutions, however, is the impact of politics.69 The 
political elites who in some cases control institutional growth often have 
self-interested reasons for maintaining an inefficient system.70 In colonial 
Ghana, for example, chiefs often have used their social and political power 
to redefine property rights for their own personal benefit.71 
Even an “efficient” formal property rights regime will not delineate 
every right, because at some point the marginal benefit of delineating a 
particular right will be outweighed by the enormous cost of doing so.72 
Land parcels in most of the world are not measured down to the 
millimeter, for example, even though such precision might yield some 
miniscule marginal gain. Enforcement costs, too, will sometimes be 
prohibitive. Police protection is costly,73 and enforcing every transaction 
may be too expensive for a developing nation without resources to spend 
on such efforts. In these circumstances, social norms, which are generally 
cheaper to operate than statutes, play an especially important role. 
Legal reformers should have already learned some of these lessons. 
The early law and development movement floundered when the legal 
reforms it suggested (generally, the establishment of Western-style law) 
met with overwhelming cultural resistance in developing countries.74 
Scholars of law, society, and development have subsequently accepted “the 
fragility of law’s grasp on social life,”75 reinforcing the argument that 
“social life” may be more important to a system of property than the status 
of written law is. The failure to account for social realities can prevent legal 
reforms from providing economic benefits, and can even detract from total 
efficiency by dividing the market instead of unifying it: “In a system held 
                                                          
67. OSTROM, supra note 45, at 198. 
68. Lin & Nugent, supra note 40, at 2324 n.21. 
69. ENSMINGER, supra note 64, at 126. 
70. NORTH, supra note 38, at 48; see also EGGERTSSON, supra note 34, at 275-76; John C. 
North, The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, in THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 17, 20 (John Harris et al. eds., 
1995). 
71. See generally FIRMIN-SELLERS, supra note 48. 
72. See generally BARZEL, supra note 4. 
73. Id. at 88-89. 
74. Nichols, supra note 41, at 294 n.309; see also David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The 
Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 4 (1990). 
75. Id. at 42. 
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to be illegitimate, where people are inclined to cheat every time they can 
get away with it, there may be little profit.”76 This “cheating” may 
eventually become so widespread and regularized that it forms a distinct 
system of informal law, in competition with the formal state system.77 
Hernando De Soto has strenuously argued that reliance on informality is a 
natural response to inefficient formal law.78 Even so, the larger the gap 
between practice and formal law, the less the latter can provide the stability 
crucial to the economic function of any property rights regime: “Because 
such law generally fails to embody internal social conventions, it often 
amounts to no more than the paper on which it is written. Far from 
enhancing predictability, it is a source of confusion and a trap for the 
unweary [sic].”79 A system that cannot deliver on its promise of 
predictability may be worse than no formal system at all. 
Social legitimacy is thus crucially important for any property system. If 
formal property rights are to perform the economizing function expected 
of them, they must have the real support of society, and this support will 
come only gradually.80 The task for institutional reform is to draft formal 
laws that will work with custom to promote tenure security and reduce 
transaction costs. Bruce writes, “The appropriate tenure system for a given 
country is ultimately one that will mesh well with its other basic economic 
and social institutions, be they socialist, capitalist, or whatever.”81 Drafters 
of property laws must thus recognize and take into account the 
interconnectedness of formal property law, social norms, and economic 
outcomes. 
 II.  CUSTOMARY LAND LAW IN GHANA 
Of course, drafters of property laws cannot properly integrate formal 
property law with custom unless they first understand the content of each. 
This Part provides a very brief overview of Ghanaian customary land 
law.82 Part III addresses statutory land law. 
                                                          
76. ENSMINGER, supra note 64, at 1. 
77. EGGERTSSON, supra note 34, at 36. Katz observes that the “real lesson of the Coase 
theorem” is “that private lawmaking is as important as public lawmaking, if not more so.” 
Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1758 (1996). 
78. DE  SOTO, supra note 1, at 102. 
79. Chibundu, supra note 8, at 257. 
80. North, supra note 70, at 25; see also NORTH, supra note 38, at 45 (“Equally important is 
the fact that the informal constraints that are culturally derived will not change immediately 
in reaction to changes in the formal rules.”). 
81. John W. Bruce, A Perspective on Indigenous Land Tenure Systems and Land Concentration, 
in LAND AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA 23, 38 (R.E. Downs & S.P. Reyna eds., 1988); 
see also NORTH, supra note 38, at 46. 
82. Not only is customary law’s content contestable, its very definition is unclear. For the 
purposes of this Note, I attempt to follow The Interpretation Act (1960), Acts of Ghana C.A. 4, 
§ 18(1), which provides a partial and generally unhelpful definition: “Customary law, as 
comprised in the law of Ghana, consists of rules of law which by custom are applicable to 
particular communities in Ghana. . . .” 
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Customary land law is the basis for most landholding in Ghana.83 In 
principle, customary law overlaps with and is subordinate to the statutory 
law described in Part III, but in practice it often replaces statutes. It is also 
difficult to systematically describe. Ghanaian courts “have not been given, 
nor do they consider that they need a precise definition of customary 
law.”84 They instead tend to generalize about customary practices.85  
Although it may sometimes be relatively easy to distinguish customary law 
from other types of law,86 the sources of customary law are as varied as the 
regions, tribes, and communities in Ghana, and its content is 
correspondingly diverse. This Note necessarily relies on generalizations 
that reflect customary land law as it is professed by customary authorities, 
or recognized by statutory courts,87 but not necessarily as it is performed 
everywhere at all times.88 The picture that emerges is of a body of law that, 
despite its shortcomings, can claim advantages of legitimacy and efficiency. 
A.  Domain of Customary Land Law 
Nearly three quarters of all undeveloped land in Ghana is held 
through customary law by individuals, families, stools89 and tendamba,90 
and understanding of customary land law appears to be as widespread as 
the law’s reach. One Ghanaian customary land law authority has asserted: 
“Everybody truly knows the law.”91 Customary laws claim such popular 
legitimacy in part because they “are not expressed in esoteric language 
requiring a great learning . . . to fathom their meanings. They are in simple 
language which requires no particular expertise or training to 
                                                          
83. See 1 SARPONG, supra note 23, at 4; KASANGA & KOTEY, supra note 20, at iii-iv. This is 
true throughout most of Africa. AGBOSU, supra note 14, at 11; John W. Bruce, Do Indigenous 
Tenure Systems Constrain Agricultural Development, in LAND IN AFRICAN AGRARIAN SYSTEMS 35, 
35 (Thomas J. Bassett & Donald E. Crummey eds., 1993). 
84.  GORDON WOODMAN, CUSTOMARY LAND LAW IN THE GHANAIAN COURTS 40 (1996). 
85. Id. at 49. 
86. See id. at 48-49. 
87. Ghanaian courts are competent to deal in customary law, except for in certain issues 
such as chieftaincy disputes. 
88. For more classical treatments of Ghanaian customary land law, see KWAMENA BENTSI-
ENCHILL, GHANA LAND LAW (1964); NII AMAA OLLENNU, OLLENNU’S PRINCIPLES OF 
CUSTOMARY LAND LAW IN GHANA (2d ed. 1985); and JOHN MENSAH SARBAH, FANTI 
CUSTOMARY LAWS (1968). For more recent commentary, see WOODMAN, supra note 84. 
89. In Ghana, “stool” refers to the customary throne, or more generally to a tribe or tribal 
leader. 
90. See KASANGA & KOTEY, supra note 20, at 13. In the northern regions, land was 
traditionally claimed by the tendamba—descendents of the original settlers in an area—rather 
than by chiefs.  However, the position of the tendamba (also referred to as tindana) has been 
largely usurped by the chieftaincy over the past century, due in part to colonial interference 
and government acquisition of land. R. Kasim Kasanga, The Role of Chiefs and “Tendamba” in 
Land Administration in Northern Ghana, in DECENTRALISATION, LAND TENURE AND LAND 
ADMINISTRATION IN NORTHERN GHANA 53, 61, 63 (1996) [hereinafter DECENTRALISATION]. 
91. KLUDZE, supra note 28, at 235. 
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understand.”92 In addition to this apparent transparency, customary law 
remains more grounded in personal relationships, social status, and 
constant negotiation. As in many traditional societies, “not one group but a 
hierarchy of groups is the focus of land rights, with each ascending group 
larger and embracing several groups of the next lower order, pyramiding 
toward a king or paramount chief of the tribe.”93 This system of rights 
embeds land rights within a well-established social structure—the tribe in 
some places, the clan or family in many others—that exists outside of the 
world of statutory law. 
B.  Customary Land Rights 
Ghanaian customary law begins from the basic tenet that all land has 
an owner.94 In fact, nearly all land has multiple owners, with a chief 
holding the highest title, and numerous other rights-holders claiming lesser 
rights of possession, use, or transfer. This embedding of the individual’s 
land rights within certain group or secondary rights is perhaps the major 
difference between customary and Western property law.95 In tying 
together different land rights, customary law builds on the social and 
political structures, such as the chieftaincy, that play an important part in 
many Ghanaians’ lives. 
The Law Reform Commission of Ghana identified four specific 
categories of interests in land in Ghana,96 which were subsequently 
officially recognized in the Land Title Registration Law of 1986. Those four 
categories are the allodial title, the freehold title, leaseholds, and other 
lesser interests in land. Leaseholds, which are derived from common law, 
are not discussed in detail here. 
The allodial title is the highest interest in land known in customary 
law, above which there can be no other interest.97 Land is generally thought 
to be vested in the “stool”—that is, the entire community—while the actual 
title to that land is legally held by the chief or other traditional leader who 
acts on behalf of that community.98 Thus, even though chiefs officially hold 
the highest title to land in most areas, they do so only in a capacity 
somewhat resembling a trusteeship, administering it for the benefit of their 
subjects—those living, dead, and not yet born. Allodial titleholders 
“execute judicial, governance, and management functions” over land,99 but 
                                                          
92. Id. 
93. Bruce, supra note 81, at 26. 
94. See OLLENNU, supra note 88, at 4. 
95. See David A. Atwood, Land Registration in Africa: The Impact of Agricultural Production¸ 
18 WORLD DEV. 659, 662 (1990). 
96. 1 SARPONG, supra note 23, at 4-6. 
97. WOODMAN, supra note 84, at 53. 
98. 1 SARPONG, supra note 23, at 4. Confusing the issue even further, chiefs themselves are 
sometimes referred to as “stools” in common parlance. 
99. KASANGA & KOTEY, supra note 20, at 13. 
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under customary law they are not allowed to alienate that land solely for 
personal benefit. 
The freehold title, which can be held in both customary and common 
law forms,100 is superior to all interests but the allodial title. The customary 
freehold, or usufruct, is an interest held by individuals or groups in land 
that is held allodially by a chief, clan, or other owner.101 The holder of a 
customary freehold title has nearly unlimited rights to develop and 
cultivate his property, subject only to restrictions imposed by the allodial 
owner. These restrictions might include a requirement to commence 
development within a year, or to construct only residential buildings. The 
customary law freehold is perpetual, subsisting as long as its holder 
continues to acknowledge the higher title of the allodial owner, and it is 
inheritable.102 The usufruct also cannot be alienated to another person or 
group by the allodial owner without the usufructury owner’s consent. 
Though the allodial title remains the highest interest in land, it is at the 
individual freehold level where real control over land is increasingly 
exercised. 103 
The final category of land rights is something of a catch all, and 
includes all lesser interests that can be created by allodial and customary 
freehold owners. Sharecropping agreements104 are the most common forms 
of these interests, particularly for tree crops such as cocoa.105 A 1989-1990 
survey of the oil palm belt in Ghana found that more than forty percent of 
farmers relied at least partially on sharecropping to secure their land.106 
Even the government itself issues share contracts, through the state-
managed Ghana Oil Palm Development Company.107 The two major types 
of sharecropping contract are abusa, under which the landowner and 
                                                          
100. Common law freeholds are similar to freeholds under English law, and are not 
addressed in detail here. They can be created through gift or sale by an allodial owner or by a 
grant by the owner of a customary freehold. Under such a grant, the parties either explicitly or 
impliedly agree that their grant should be regulated by common law. 1 SARPONG, supra note 
23, at 5. 
101. Article 266 of the Ghanaian Constitution bars the creation of freeholds in favor of 
non-citizens. CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA art. 266. 
102. 1 SARPONG, supra note 23, at 4. 
103. See Kotei v. Asere Stool [1961] G.L.R. 492 (Ghana); WOODMAN, supra note 84, at 180; 
Interview with Dr. L. Odame-Larbi, Executive Secretary, Lands Commission, in Accra, Ghana 
(Apr. 22, 2002) (expressing the view that were it not for constitutional provisions banning 
freehold, customary lands would by now be individually owned under law). Gordon 
Woodman’s recent work on customary land law in the Ghanaian courts argues that in 
contemporary Ghana the customary freehold “effectively supersedes the allodial title,” even 
as it remains closely bound up with that title. WOODMAN, supra note 84, at 87. 
104. The Akan word is domayenkyε, or “weed and let us share.” KOJO S. AMANOR & 
MAXWELL KUDE DIDERUTUAH, INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T. AND DEV., SHARE CONTRACTS IN THE OIL 
PALM AND CITRUS BELT OF GHANA 1 (2001). 
105. The classic discussions of cocoa farming and share contracts in Ghana are POLLY 
HILL, THE GOLD COAST COCOA FARMER: A PRELIMINARY STUDY (1956) and POLLY HILL, THE 
MIGRANT COCOA-FARMERS OF SOUTHERN GHANA: A STUDY IN RURAL CAPITALISM (1963). 
106. AMANOR & DIDERUTUAH, supra note 104, at 3. 
107. Id. at 20. 
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laborer split returns into thirds, and abunu, under which returns are split in 
half. Whether a tenancy is abusa or abunu depends on a number of factors, 
including the availability of land, the kinship or social connection between 
landlord and tenant, the intensity of labor required for cultivation, and the 
reputation of the tenant farmer.108 
Though the concept of sharecropping tends to inspire fears of 
exploitation, contemporary sharecropping has become a vital and generally 
equitable part of the Ghanaian agricultural economy, changing and 
developing over the years to meet the needs of landowners and farmers. 
For example, sharecropping contracts are increasingly being written down, 
with the landlord, tenant, and a witness each keeping a copy of the 
terms,109 rather than relying on the perceived social standing of the 
landowner and the laborer. Moreover, sharecropping serves a number of 
straightforward economic functions. It can, for example, serve to hoard 
labor in times of shortage, share risks when and where a failed risk can be 
catastrophic, offer incentive through selective exclusion, and increase 
productivity through the maintenance of continued relationships.110 
C.  Acquiring Land under Customary Law 
The customary rights in land described above can be acquired in a 
wide variety of ways, including grant, rent, share contract, inheritance, and 
gift.111 The forms and mechanisms of transfer under customary law are of 
course drawn from tradition, but also reflect the contemporary social and 
economic needs of each individual area. 
Subjects of a chief can sometimes claim a tract of unused stool land free 
of charge simply by virtue of their membership in the stool community, 
though population pressures have made such unused land increasingly 
rare. A “stranger” (a member of another tribal community) can acquire 
interest in stool land by explicit grant, contract, or some other means of 
transfer. Residency or use of land, however, will not suffice: Long 
undisturbed possession by a non-owner, whether a trespasser or a person 
with a limited interest, cannot ripen into title to land under customary 
law.112 When stool land is allocated, recipients of stool land pay “drinks 
money” to the proper chief, after which no additional rent-type payments 
are generally required.113 Though this drinks money was traditionally paid 
                                                          
108. Id. at 6, 15-16. 
109. Id. at 17. 
110. Pranab Bardhan, Alternative Approaches to Development Economics, in 1 HANDBOOK OF 
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 39, 49 (Hollis Chenery & T.N. Srinivasan eds., 1988). 
111. The customary law of land transfers has been superseded by state law in those few 
areas declared to be registration districts, WOODMAN, supra note 84, at 405, but it remains the 
basic form of conveyance for most Ghanaians. 
112. See Kasanga, supra note 90, at 31 (citing Kuma v. Kuma [1938] 5 WACA 4 PC). 
113. R. KASIM KASANGA ET AL., LAND MARKETS AND LEGAL CONTRADICTIONS IN THE PERI-
URBAN AREA OF ACCRA GHANA: INFORMANT INTERVIEWS AND SECONDARY DATA 
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in the form of kola nuts or schnapps, today it can amount to millions of 
cedis in cash, essentially reflecting a purchase price.114 The chief generally 
does not share these payments with the rest of the community, since their 
original function was as a symbol of allegiance to the chief, not as valuable 
consideration. 
The exact form of land transaction varies greatly from area to area, and 
government attempts to impose uniformity on customary modes of 
inheritance and other forms of transfer have largely failed.115 Even without 
formal state mechanisms, customary transactions are usually accompanied 
by some kind of traditional publicity or other “documentation,” often the 
presentation of some small bit of property such as drinks or an animal.116 In 
many Akan areas, for example, the guaha ceremony accompanies all land 
sales.117 Since written documentation is not sufficient (and may not be 
necessary) to affect a valid transfer of customary land rights,118 these 
ceremonial requirements help facilitate and guarantee customary 
transactions. 
D.  Roles and Powers of Chiefs 
As the preceding description makes clear, the basic customary land 
law in Ghana remains deeply embedded in the social and cultural systems 
of tribes, clans, and other traditional groups, despite the competing 
machinery of the modern state. This is true in most African nations, but 
particularly so in Ghana, where traditional authorities command an 
exceptional amount of power. As one Ghanaian commentator put it: “Land 
matters are inextricably linked with the roles of traditional authorities.”119 
As the allodial titleholders of tribal land, customary authorities at the top 
of that structure nominally own nearly eighty percent of the land in Ghana. 
The day-to-day management of land, however, is left to those individuals, 
families and sub-chiefs who hold customary freeholds, leases, and other 
lesser interests. 
Rathbone writes, “[I]t is pointless to demand to be told precisely what 
a Ghanaian chief was or is.”120 Not only do individual chiefs vary 
                                                          
INVESTIGATIONS 1 (1996). 
114. Id. The cedi is the basic unit of Ghanaian currency. 
115. See Migot-Adholla, supra note 62, at 164; KASANGA & KOTEY, supra note 20, at 13. 
116. See WOODMAN, supra note 84, at 370 (discussing whether publicity is necessary for a 
valid customary conveyance). 
117. Id. at 350. AGBOSU, supra note 14, at 16-17. 
118. WOODMAN, supra note 84, at 367. 
119. Benjamin Kunbuor, Decentralisation and Land Administration in Northern Ghana – A 
Legal Perspective, in DECENTRALISATION, supra note 90, at 84, 88; see also AGBOSU, supra note 14, 
at 11-12. See also KLUDZE, supra note 28, at 236. 
120. RICHARD RATHBONE, NKRUMAH AND THE CHIEFS: THE POLITICS OF CHIEFTAINCY IN 
GHANA 1951-1960, at 9 (2000). Article 277 of the Ghanaian Constitution defines a chief as “a 
person who, hailing from the appropriate family and lineage, has been validly nominated, 
elected or selected and enstooled, enskinned or installed as a chief or queenmother in 
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immensely in power, wealth, charisma, and responsibility, but customary 
authorities take many different forms throughout the country, from the 
tendamba “land chiefs” of the north, to the powerful centralized 
chieftaincies of the Akan, to the family and clan leaders who dominate the 
Volta region.121 Though these leaders no longer claim much formal political 
or military authority,122 the chieftaincy appears to be gaining in popularity 
across the country and its power remains great.123 Even in areas of Ghana 
where they do not exercise major administrative power over land, chiefs 
remain the most important source of information about land matters for 
the majority of Ghanaians.124 Despite their importance, however, 
government land policy has scarcely tapped the power that chiefs 
command and the information they control. Indeed, chiefs are generally 
not even aware of government land policy, objectives, and programs. 
Some of this disconnect can be traced to the colonial period, which had 
a lasting impact on the chieftaincy and has serious implications for any 
discussions of future government-chieftaincy partnerships.125 Faced with 
the prospect of setting up a successful colonial administration in the Gold 
Coast with very limited resources, British colonial officials turned to the 
chiefs.126 Attempting to capitalize on chiefs’ social legitimacy, the British 
made them the lynchpin of their “indirect rule” approach to 
administration. 127  One of the most lasting impacts of this exploitation was 
the alienation of stool land in contravention of traditional customary law, 
as chiefs sold stool land for their own benefit,128 stoking the anger and 
popular power of the educated urban elite, who exacted their revenge after 
independence.129 Because chiefs retain real political power,130 attempts to 
                                                          
accordance with the relevant customary law and usage.” CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA 
art. 277. 
121. KLUDZE, supra note 28, at 35-36. Chieftaincies are often referred to as “stools,” after 
the throne-like stools that serve as symbols of tribal identity. Though they exist in physical 
form, stools are unlike thrones in that they are not meant to be sat upon, nor often seen by the 
public. Id. at 236. For simplicity’s sake, this paper will use the terms “traditional authorities,” 
“stools,” and “chiefs” to encompass the myriad chiefs, clan leaders, family heads, tendamba 
and other figures who hold customary power over land. 
122. E.A. BOATENG, GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE: OUTLOOK FOR DEMOCRACY IN GHANA 
156 (1996). 
123. Id. at 143. 
124. A 1999 study of the private and customary land market reported that chiefs, elders 
and families were the most commonly cited source of land information (62% of men and 63% 
of women reporting them as such), along with friends (56% and 63%). Newspapers were the 
next most often cited source (24% and 20%), with land sector agencies (9% of both men and 
women) and District Assemblies (8% and 7%) significantly less common. CENTER FOR 
DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 19, at 71.  
125. See infra notes 133-145 and accompanying text. 
126. RATHBONE, supra note 120, at 10. 
127. R.B. Benning, Land Ownership, Divestiture and Benficiary Rights in Northern Ghana: 
Critical Issues, in DECENTRALISATION, supra note 90, at 20, 28-29. See generally FIRMIN-SELLERS, 
supra note 48. 
128. RATHBONE, supra note 120, at 15. 
129. Id. at 11. 
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restrict their official authority have actually undermined attempts to make 
them more accountable131 by ignoring the reality of their influence. Kludze 
suggests that “any reform of chieftaincy, and it certainly needs reform, 
must have as its objective the integration of chiefs into the institutional 
structures of modern government,” without again making chiefs 
administrators for central government policy, as they were in colonial 
times.132 Part V of this Note suggests such a reform. 
 III.  STATUTORY LAND LAW IN GHANA 
A.  Colonial Period and its Impact 
Early colonial enactments133 served to officially introduce the 
contemporary law of Britain—“[t]he common law, the doctrines of equity, 
and the statutes of general application”—as the fundamental law of the 
Gold Coast (as Ghana was then known), though “these provisions merely 
confirmed the existing position of English law on the Gold Coast.”134 As 
early as the 1844 Gold Coast Jurisdiction Order-in-Council, judges in the 
Gold Coast had been instructed to apply English law where customary law 
was not “compatible with the principles of the Law of England.”135 This 
was consistent with colonial practice throughout much of Africa, as 
colonial powers generally introduced their own law as the basic law of the 
colony but allowed custom to continue in certain areas of law so long as it 
did not run afoul of the colonial administration or “civilized” notions of 
justice and equity.136 Early colonial ordinances almost universally left land 
tenure within the ambit of customary law.137 
As the colonial government took a more active part in the daily rule of 
the Gold Coast, however, it became clear that customary law was accepted 
and supported only to the degree that its legitimacy and stability could be 
exploited, particularly by involving chiefs in colonial administration. 
                                                          
130. SARA B. BERRY, CHIEFS KNOW THEIR BOUNDARIES 115 (2001) (“Excluded de jure from 
electoral politics and formal administration in postcolonial Ghana, chiefs are extensively 
involved de facto in both.”). 
131. Id. 
132. KLUDZE, supra note 28, at 533. 
133. See, e.g., The Supreme Court Ordinance, No. 4 (1876); THE ORDINANCES OF THE GOLD 
COAST COLONY (1909) (extending extant British law to Ghana) (currently codified as The 
Courts Ordinance (Cap. 4, 1951 Rev. Laws of the Gold Coast)). 
134.  ANTONY ALLOTT, NEW ESSAYS IN AFRICAN LAW 17 (1970). The land law “received” by 
Ghana and the other English colonies in Africa was the “old” land law, as it stood prior to the 
major 1925 land law reforms in England, which introduced widespread titling and other 
reforms. Patrick McAuslan, Only the Name of the Country Changes: The Diaspora of “European” 
Land Law in Commonwealth Africa, in EVOLVING LAND RIGHTS, POLICY AND TENURE IN AFRICA, 
supra note 10, at 75, 79. 
135. ALLOTT, supra note 134, at 17 (quoting the Order-in-Council). 
136. Id. at 11. 
137. See T. OLAWALE ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 6 (1956). 
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Customary rights were abused as some chiefs leased communal lands to 
foreign capitalists.138 Certain privileged natives, generally chiefs and the 
literate or law-educated, could benefit from this system through 
speculation or brokerage, with disastrous results for the average 
Ghanaian.139 
Following independence in 1957, the new Ghanaian government, like 
many others in Africa, was torn between the desire to modernize and the 
desire to reclaim traditions that had been shattered by colonial rule. In the 
revolutionary spirit of the times, this apparent dichotomy claimed crucial 
importance: 
 
On the one hand, they, as African governments, feel it essential to 
reject those parts of their legal systems which appear to be an alien 
imposition, and to go back to a more “African” law relying on 
indigenous cultural and moral values; on the other hand, the same 
governments are prepared ruthlessly to sweep away any of their 
old institutions which seem to hold up progress or national 
unity.140 
A nationalist and increasingly urban Ghanaian elite tried to shrug off 
traditional leadership in favor of “modern” state socialism, and Kwame 
Nkrumah, Ghana’s revered independence leader, pursued a devastating 
political and legal campaign against the chieftaincy.141 
Nkrumah’s approach persists, albeit in much less radical form, in the 
1992 Constitution, the most important legal document affecting 
contemporary land law in Ghana. Apparently drawing from historical 
experience, the Constitution leaves land law partially in the domain of 
custom, while simultaneously continuing a relatively elaborate machinery 
to control the use and sale of stool land.142 Following customary law 
principles, Article 267(1) of the 1992 Constitution vests all stool lands in the 
appropriate stool or skin (chief or other traditional authority) in trust for 
the subjects of that stool “in accordance with customary law and usage.”143 
But although the Constitution recognizes chiefs’ customary ownership of 
lands, it also establishes broad state oversight of that ownership. Article 
36(8) of the Constitution formalizes chiefs’ fiduciary relationship to their 
subjects, declaring that land ownership, particularly for chiefs, carries with 
                                                          
138. L.K. Agbosu, Land Registration in Ghana: Past, Present and the Future, 34 J. AFR. L. 104, 
107 (1990); see also Concessions Ordinance, 1939 (Gold Coast). 
139. AGBOSU, supra note 14, at 20-21. 
140. ALLOTT, supra note 134, at 14. 
141. RATHBONE, supra note 120, at 3-7; see also FIRMIN-SELLERS, supra note 48, at 114-18. 
142. 1 SARPONG, supra note 23, at 9. 
143. CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA art. 267, § 1 (“All stool lands in Ghana shall vest 
in the appropriate stool on behalf of, and in trust for the subjects of the stool in accordance 
with customary law and usage.”). 
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it a “social obligation to serve the larger community.”144 Article 267(5) 
controls the use of stool land by prohibiting the creation of a freehold 
interest in any stool land: “[N]o interest in, or right over, any stool land in 
Ghana shall be created which vests in any person or body of persons a 
freehold interest howsoever described.”145 Though the impact of this 
provision is somewhat unclear, it was apparently intended to prevent 
chiefs from alienating stool lands, whether vacant or occupied by subjects. 
B.  Government Administration of Customary Lands 
The Constitution sets up governmental machinery to oversee, and in 
some cases effectively take over, the management and administration of 
stool lands. The two government bodies with major responsibility in this 
area are the Lands Commission and the Office of the Administrator of 
Stool Lands (OASL). The Lands Commission’s constitutional charge 
includes managing public lands, formulating land policy, advising 
traditional authorities on land use, and assisting in the execution of a title 
registration program throughout the country.146 The Lands Commission 
and its regional offices, the Regional Lands Commissions, consist of 
representatives from various groups including the National House of 
Chiefs, the Ghana Bar Association and, at the regional level, each District 
Assembly within the region.147 
Though the Lands Commission retains important authority over stool 
land, particularly the power of concurrence described below, the state’s 
power is largely wielded by the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands 
(OASL). Under the Constitution, the Administrator of Stool Lands and the 
Regional Lands Commissions are jointly charged with consulting the chiefs 
and other traditional authorities to form “a policy framework for the 
rational and productive development and management of stool lands.”148 
The OASL is also responsible for collecting all rents and revenues 
generated by stool lands. Revenue thus collected is disbursed by the OASL 
as follows: ten percent to the Administrator of Stool Lands for 
administrative expenses, twenty percent to the “traditional authority,” 
fifty-five percent to the District Assembly in the area, and twenty-five 
percent “to the stool through the traditional authority for the maintenance 
                                                          
144. CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA art. 36, § 8 (“The State shall recognise that 
ownership and possession of land carry a social obligation to serve the larger community and, 
in particular, the State shall recognise that the managers of public, stool, skin and family lands 
are fiduciaries charged with the obligation to discharge their functions for the benefit 
respectively of the people of Ghana, of the stool, skin, or family concerned and are 
accountable as fiduciaries in this regard.”). 
145.  CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA  art. 267, § 5. 
146. CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA art. 258, § 1. 
147. CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA arts. 259-61. 
148. CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA art. 267, § 8. 
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of the stool in keeping with its status.”149 The OASL is required to keep 
separate accounts for each stool’s lands and to submit these accounts 
annually to the sector Minister (the Minister for Lands and Forestry), who 
must then bring them before Parliament. 150 
Perhaps the most controversial role of stool land administration—a 
power actually exercised by the Lands Commission, not the OASL—is that 
of providing consent and concurrence to the disposition of stool lands. The 
government must approve all stool land transactions involving monetary 
consideration.151 This power has been justified as preventing duplicate 
grants of the same piece of land and ensuring that the intended use of the 
granted land conforms to zoning and planning restrictions and generates 
enough revenue for the stools and District Assemblies.152 In practice, few of 
these goals have been met. Duplicate grants and freeholds continue to 
spread almost unabated, as chiefs have consistently and effectively resisted 
government attempts to define what transactions they can and cannot 
carry out, at times by misreporting grants and rents. For example, the 
concurrence requirement does not apply to grants of land to subjects who 
are entitled to that land through their status as members of the community, 
and the customary “drinks” payment associated with these grants—
traditionally a nominal honorarium, not a sale price—has been exempt 
from reporting.153 Over time, that small payment has grown so that it now 
approximates the market value of land, allowing chiefs to essentially sell 
land without reporting its cost. 
The government has worsened these problems by failing to meet its 
own administrative responsibilities. In 1996, one study reported an average 
turnaround time of five years to secure concurrence to a private land 
transaction.154 Even a government-commissioned 2001 consultancy report 
estimated five months turnaround time, during which a total of perhaps 
sixteen days of “effort time” would have to be expended by the party 
seeking concurrence.155 These transaction costs are not merely frustrating; 
they can be insurmountable. Institutional failures on the part of 
government have thus effectively made the concurrence requirement a ban 
on the disposition of stool lands.156 Even when concurrence is given and 
stool land is legally sold or transferred, the distribution of revenue from 
                                                          
149. CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA art. 267, § 6. See infra note 121 for an explanation 
of the “stool.” 
150. Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands Act, 1994, §§ 14-16.  
151. See WOODMAN, supra note 84, at 72. 
152. 1 SARPONG, supra note 23, at 36-37 (internal citations omitted). 
153. The drinks payment was originally conceived as an honorary gift, often gin or 
schnapps, given to a chief in return for free customary land. Over time it developed into a 
cash payment, which has grown in size over time. 
154. KASANGA ET AL., LAND MARKETS AND LEGAL CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 113, at 51. 
155. NATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL RENEWAL PROGRAMME (ACCRA), COMMERCIALISATION OF 
THE LAND TITLE REGISTRY: PROJECT SUMMARY AND RE-ENGINEERING PLAN 52 (2001) (report of 
C2SI Richard Morny & Associates Link-Consult Consortium). 
156. KASANGA ET AL., supra note 113, at 7. 
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the transfer has sometimes been inequitable. Chiefs and their subjects 
frequently express dissatisfaction with how District Assemblies utilize the 
stool land revenue they receive.157 The money Assemblies receive from 
stool land revenue is after all required by law to be spent for the benefit of 
the stool community.158 
The most damning problem with stool land administration, however, 
is not so much practical as it is principled. As Kasanga et al. point out, “[i]t 
is difficult to reconcile the idea of stools owning land and managing it day 
to day while the government and its officials control all other important 
decisions affecting land, including the timing of land disposal and the 
distribution of the income therefrom.”159 The government thus controls 
both the collection of rents and the transfer of land, perhaps the two most 
crucial incidents of land ownership. The latter power is “negative” only, in 
that the government cannot grant stool land, but in any case the 
government’s control comes very close to full ownership. 
C.  Domain of Statutory Land Law 
The most telling evidence of statutory land law’s failure is the fact that 
most people ignore it whenever possible. Statutory policies from 
administration of stool land to title registration have faced massive 
intransigence. Kasanga suggests that perhaps only ten percent of land 
acquirers in the North ever approach the Lands Commission for official, 
formal documentation of their landholding.160 In his 1988 study of rural 
Ghana, in fact, only a single respondent out of more than 400 was reported 
as complying fully with agricultural legislation.161 Even the rate of 
compliance in cities, where landowners are close to the government’s 
administrative machinery, is not encouraging, and after fifteen years of 
land title registration less than five percent of the country was registered. 
In a 1999 study, only half of the respondents who had registered their land 
were able to do so in less than a year, with the remainder spending up to 
ten years to do so, and at a cost that most Ghanaians could not afford.162 
With such obstacles in their way, it is unsurprising that most people avoid 
statutory land law and administration. 
The picture that emerges from this brief history is nuanced. Colonial 
law was not overtly and directly hostile to customary law. It did not seek to 
eliminate all customary authorities, nor to wipe out their rules. However, 
only those rules and authorities that conformed to colonial expectations 
were tolerated. The legal changes imposed by statutory property law were 
                                                          
157. 1 SARPONG, supra note 23, at 34. 
158. Id. 
159. KASANGA ET AL., supra note 113, at 52. 
160. KASANGA & KOTEY, supra note 20, at 20. 
161. Kasanga, supra note 90, at 48. 
162. CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 19, at 17. 
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made not at the behest of the mass of small landowners—most of whom 
were still living under customary land law and adapting that system to 
meet their needs—but from above. This is not the parable envisioned by 
property rights theorists who see property law “evolving” in response to 
changing social or economic pressures.163 
  IV.  INTEGRATING CUSTOMARY AND STATUTORY LAND LAW 
Part I of this Note argued that the integration of formal and informal 
institutions is key to the success of any property system. Parts II and III 
broadly sketched the content of statutory and customary law—the formal 
and informal institutions in question. This Part suggests how customary 
law can be better identified and integrated with Ghana’s statutory system. 
A.  The Process of Identifying Customary Land Law 
If integration of formal and customary land law is ever to succeed, it 
will require the systematic, careful, and precise study of Ghanaian 
customary law in all its local variations. In order to be flexible, equitable, 
and accurate, such a process must partner appropriate customary 
authorities (who have knowledge of and authority over customary law) 
with government authorities (who have the power to formally recognize it) 
and stakeholders (whose rights are being identified). Decentralization of 
this partnership is not merely prudent; it is necessary. 
Setting up local forums to clarify the customary rules of each 
community would be an excellent foundation for this identification.164 
Drawing on a broad membership, local forums could be charged with the 
creation of suitable standard tenancy agreements for their area.165 In doing 
so they would have to incorporate each community’s particular property-
related practices, drawing up custom-friendly agreements166 in familiar 
terms while simultaneously carrying out documentation and organization. 
Similarly, Delville suggests a two-part process that would combine local 
recognition of the details of an agreement with acknowledgement of its 
existence by the government.167 In both cases, strengthening the connection 
between the customary and state sectors is key. To further that goal, local 
government administrators could draw up simple draft transaction 
                                                          
163. See generally Platteau, supra note 51. 
164. PHILLIPPE LAVIGNE DELVILLE ET AL., SECURING SECONDARY RIGHTS TO LAND IN WEST 
AFRICA 19 (Int’l Inst. for Env’t & Dev., 2001). 
165. 1 SARPONG, supra note 23, at 17. 
166. Sarpong suggests that these agreements should include the particulars of the parties 
and capacities in which they are transacting; the nature of the interest conveyed; an accurate 
description of the land, which may include a proper survey where necessary (such as in some 
urban areas) or perhaps a traditional demarcation in other areas; the consideration, if any; any 
covenants; and the agreement of relevant sub-stools or paramount chiefs. Id. at 17-18. 
167. DELVILLE, supra note 164, at 15. 
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documents in both the local language and the language of government. 
Furthermore, the government could make better use of already-existing 
Ghanaian legal mechanisms. Under the Chieftaincy Act, for example, the 
National House of Chiefs has the power to make declarations of customary 
law, which can in turn be given legal effect by the President in consultation 
with the Chief Justice.168 This power, which is currently rarely used, could 
be employed to help shape the general principles of customary land law, or 
to resolve local-level disputes about its content. At a more grassroots level, 
better recording mechanisms for local land tribunals could eventually lead 
to the evolution of a common law of custom.169 Though it is too much to 
expect that the decisions of local land tribunals would immediately lead to 
a precise, consistent body of customary land law, their decisions might 
well be valuable for establishing certain broad principles such as whether 
possession of land can ever ripen into ownership, or whether sales in a 
particular area require the agreement of the allodial titleholder. 
After the general rules of ownership in a given area are clarified, 
attention can be given to identifying the actual legal rights that attach to 
each physical parcel of land. Just as local-level committees should identify 
local rules of ownership, individuals themselves should identify 
landholding practices at the parcel level. Many African nations, notably 
Ghana’s western neighbor Côte d’Ivoire,170 have employed a participatory, 
parcel-level system of recording individual rights with some success. Côte 
d’Ivoire has in fact been held up as a model for nations seeking to integrate 
customary law with a land registration program. Its innovative approach 
to participatory titling, 1998’s Rural Land Plan (PFR), was sketched out in a 
letter to the Council of Ministers in December 1988: 
 
The PFR involves [. . .] a survey of existing rights to plots of rural 
land, by establishing their geographical boundaries on a 1/10,000 
map and by entering each surveyed plot on a register [. . .] The PFR 
will take stock of the present land tenure situation by recording 
rights to land as they are perceived and recognised by the village 
people and the administration, and as they emerge from 
agreements between individuals, neighbours, families and villages. 
To be recorded, such rights must be expressed before one of the 
pilot project survey teams and must not be contested by other 
interested parties.171 
The PFR is thus based on a participatory approach that takes as its 
starting point the range of existing customary rules of land tenure.172 Plot 
                                                          
168. Chieftaincy Act, 1971, 370 § 42(3). 
169. McAuslan, supra note 134, at 94. 
170.  See VOLKER STAMM, THE RURAL LAND PLAN: AN INNOVATIVE APPROACH FROM CÔTE 
D’IVOIRE (Int’l Inst. for Env’t & Dev., Issue Paper No. 91, 2000). 
171. Id. at 2 (quoting the letter). 
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maps are based on aerial photographs, and rights over land are established 
individually, through a plot-by-plot enquiry resulting in a form signed by 
the head of the survey team, the land manager, land users, neighbors, and 
any other interested parties.173 Perhaps because the implementation 
employs such a grassroots approach, it has been well received by most 
villagers, and reported disputes are remarkably low, involving only two 
percent of all plots.174 
Unfortunately, the innovative, participatory process of the PFR is not 
matched in its actual treatment of customary rights. Most notably, it seems 
to adhere too closely to a belief that “modern law” can solve the problems 
of the land sector, a presumption embodied in the fact that formal 
ownership rights can only be acquired through the register, and that 
customary rights must be registered within ten years or else revert to the 
state.175 Moreover, customary land rights are reduced to two categories—
land management and land use—and there has been little provision for 
protecting the already tenuous rights of women.176 In order to improve on 
the PFR, Ghana should establish a system wherein government land 
administrators visit actual landholdings and record their size and incidents 
alongside the property owner, neighbors, and other interested parties such 
as tenants or secondary rights holders. The resulting agreement, since it 
incorporates the views and potential objections of so many relevant parties, 
should be more secure than titles granted by a far-away government 
agency. 
Identifying custom community-by-community is not a simple process, 
however, and will require patience and intensive research. A pragmatic 
approach to formalizing land rights “should not depend exclusively on the 
establishment of legal rights to ownership but establish a process whereby 
rights, and the assigning of rights, are recognised and guaranteed by clear 
procedures which are perceived as legitimate by the various groups of actors 
involved.”177 In other words, the initial focus, as laid out here, should be on 
establishing an equitable and efficient process of identifying customary 
land rights. 
Above all, any attempt to identify customary law must proceed from 
the recognition that customary law is almost by definition contestable and 
fluid. Scholars have challenged the very notion of customary law as a 
system capable of definition.178 Moreover, as recounted above, self-
interested parties will attempt to shape the boundaries of customary law to 
their own benefit. Various attempts to codify customary law during the 
colonial period, for example, were accompanied by rent-seeking and abuse 
of custom. I do not mean here to be overly sanguine about the prospects for 
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174. Id. at 12-13. 
175. Id. at 16, 19. 
176. Id. at 13. 
177. DELVILLE, supra note 164, at 5 (emphasis in original). 
178. See generally NEGOTIATING PROPERTY IN AFRICA, supra note 48.  
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a nationwide identification of customary law. But given the problems 
caused by the existence of parallel systems and the obvious differences 
between today’s democratic Ghana and the old colonial government, these 
suggestions are offered in the hope that some improvement is possible. 
B.  Statutory Recognition of Customary Rights 
Once the content of customary land law has been identified, the next 
and equally crucial step is to give customary land rights appropriate status 
and protection under statutory law. This, too, will be a difficult task, for 
customary rights do not usually fit into the categories commonly 
recognized by statutory law. Customary law also does not require the same 
kind of documentation that is common in the statutory system, so a good 
root of title may mean totally different things in the customary and 
statutory sectors.179 More importantly, not every principle of customary 
law must or even should be given government support, especially those 
principles that unfairly discriminate against women and migrants. In sum, 
the formal recognition of customary land law, just like its identification, 
requires careful and precise legal action. 
One obvious way to formally recognize customary law is through the 
official registration of customary interests, a process that has become 
common in many African countries. Some nations, notably Niger and Côte 
d’Ivoire, have even attempted to register customary rights at an individual 
or household level, but again the effect of registration varies greatly.180 In 
Niger, for example, registration results in a formal legal title while in Côte 
d’Ivoire the certificate of registration carries somewhat less weight.181 
In Ghana, statutory law does allow for the registration of customary 
rights, but has not gone far enough towards making such registration a real 
possibility. The Conveyancing Decree 1973, for example, required 
customary transactions to be written, a requirement that would have 
effectively made nearly every customary transaction illegal according to 
state law. The sections setting up this requirement were fortunately never 
implemented, and were subsequently repealed by the Land Title 
Registration Law 1986 (PNDCL 152).182 The Lands Registry Act 1962 (Act 
122) similarly did not allow for the registration of the oral transactions 
under which most customary land transactions are conducted.183 This 
further alienated the customary land sector, which was and is the basis of 
Ghana’s land market. In order to encourage the registration or 
“formalization” of customary rights, state law must make it easier and 
more enticing for customary rightsholders to participate in the state 
                                                          
179. DE  SOTO, supra note 1, at 166.  
180.  Toulmin & Quan, supra note 10, at 20.  
181. Id. at 20-21. 
182. WOODMAN, supra note 84, at 347 n.1. 
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system. Better connections between traditional authorities and the private 
sector, especially lawyers and surveyors, would facilitate this process. But 
the law itself could also be more accommodating of customary modes of 
conveyance such as the public guaha ceremonies described in Chapter III. 
Rather than requiring adherence to particular state-provided conveyancing 
forms, for example, land sector agencies could accept proof of a properly 
conducted guaha ceremony as sufficient evidence of a conveyance’s 
legitimacy. 
Recognizing customary rights does not always require major changes 
in law, but rather a more careful and imaginative use of the tools already at 
the state’s disposal. Courts could, for example, rely more often on the 
concept of the trust to more accurately reflect the interlocking land rights in 
most Ghanaian customary communities, since the chief’s “ownership” of 
stool land, as described in Part II, is more analogous to that of a trust 
administrator than to that of a fee simple owner.184 Enforcing that trust, 
rather than trying to eradicate or replace it, should be a major goal of the 
courts. In Kenya, courts have employed the concept of an implied trust to 
uphold the claims of some aggrieved parties who assert ownership under 
customary law to land registered in the name of another,185 thus mitigating 
registration’s potential impact on customary rights. In such cases the 
courts, supported in practice by the Chief Land Registrar and Attorney 
General, “simply infer the existence of a trust from the relationship of the 
parties and the surrounding circumstances” and restrain the proprietor 
from acting to the detriment of the beneficial owners.186 
C.  Caveat: Protecting Secondary Rights 
Land registration programs throughout Africa unfortunately have 
often inadvertently extinguished secondary (also known as “derived”) 
rights by overly simplifying land ownership. Future tenure reform must 
take care not to repeat the same mistake. Increased security for the 
registered owner of a parcel of land often means greater insecurity for 
secondary users who also have some un-registered rights in the same 
land.187 Derived rights arrangements reflect the overlapping nature of land 
                                                          
184. CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA art. 267, § 1 (“All stool lands in Ghana shall vest 
in the appropriate stool on behalf of, and in trust for the subjects of the stool in accordance 
with customary law and usage.”); CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA art. 36, § 8 (“The State 
shall recognise that ownership and possession of land carry a social obligation to serve the 
larger community and, in particular, the State shall recognise that the managers of public, 
stool, skin and family lands are fiduciaries charged with the obligation to discharge their 
functions for the benefit respectively of the people of Ghana, of the stool, skin, or family 
concerned and are accountable as fiduciaries in this regard.”). 
185. Simon Coldham, The Effect of Registration of Title Upon Customary Land Rights in Kenya, 
22 J. AFR. L. 91, 107-08 (1978). 
186. Id. at 107. 
187. Platteau, supra note 51, at 40. 
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rights, and are dependent on the social relationship between the 
contracting parties. Statutory changes which make that relationship 
irrelevant can simultaneously take away the security it provides. As 
Adams argues, “[t]enure reform must propose ways of recognising the 
multiple uses of land rather than simplisitically conferring formal 
recognition on established occupants and/or resource users.”188 For 
example, when a land register records a single owner for a piece of land 
rather than recording the multitude of secondary rights holders (often 
women and migrants) who have customary rights of access, use, or 
possession to that land, the latter group’s rights may disappear due to non-
registration. This statutory extinction of land rights due to non-registration 
seems overly harsh in Ghana, given that knowledge of registration 
procedures is anything but widespread. 
Fortunately, the Land Title Registration Law 1986189 attempts to 
provide for the protection of derived customary rights. One of the basic 
provisions of the law is that a registered title is indefeasible and provides 
conclusive evidence of land ownership190 free from all interests except for 
certain overriding interests.191 These overriding interests are listed in 
Section 46, and include easements, rights of way, profits, leases of less than 
two years, and certain customary rights. Section 46(1)(f) specifically holds 
that a title is subject to “rights, whether acquired by customary law or 
otherwise, of every person in actual occupation of the land save where 
enquiry is made of such person and the rights are not disclosed.”192 This 
provision is helpful for securing certain kinds of customary rights, such as 
public rights of way and the claims of those customary holders who are in 
occupation of land and in a position to assert their rights. It offers little 
protection, however, to those who claim secondary access rights to another 
person’s freehold, or who are not able to claim their rights, or are not 
aware of the need to do so. For example, statutory safeguards for women 
mean very little in practice when few women even know of their 
existence.193 This problem can be partially alleviated by intensive public 
education campaigns prior to and concurrent with any titling program, 
and through the involvement of NGOs and other organizations interested 
in women’s rights. The state must also be more flexible in recognizing and 
accepting the validity of traditional contracts such as sharecropping and 
other derived rights arrangements. Forbidding, ignoring, or attacking 
derived rights agreements without providing suitable alternatives 
threatens both efficiency and equity. 
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There is no easy way for statutory law to protect secondary users’ 
rights, and clumsy statutory reform can worsen the situation. The best 
solutions must come from a community-level change in attitudes and the 
creation of land administration structures that are committed to protecting 
the land rights of women, migrants, and other secondary rights holders. 
Part V explores the shape such structures might take. 
 V.  INTEGRATING CUSTOMARY AND STATUTORY AUTHORITIES 
Land tenure reform in Africa often focuses exclusively on the problem 
of recognizing customary rules, ignoring the customary authorities who 
are themselves a fundamental part of traditional land tenure regimes.194 
The colonial administration of Africa—which nominally supported 
customary law, but only through hand-picked and compliant customary 
authorities—illustrates the point quite clearly. Due to the almost inherently 
contestable nature of customary law, it is especially important to consider 
who will be given authority to define and implement that law. This Part 
thus presents policy suggestions for how customary authorities, like 
customary law itself, can be integrated into a single unified property 
system. 
In practice, customary authorities’ power over the application of law 
can be just as important for legal outcomes as the written content of the 
rules themselves. Arguing that traditional leaders should play a role in the 
machinery of local-level land administration does not mean abandoning 
concerns of economic efficiency. In fact, “[e]mphasizing a crucial role for 
village communities is not to fall into the snare of romanticism, but is 
rather a pragmatic attitude grounded in a realistic assessment of Sub-
Saharan Africa’s present predicament,” especially given the demonstrated 
failure of state-led land reforms all across the continent.195 Though 
traditional land management systems do not always function perfectly, 
especially in urban and peri-urban areas, they remain, in the words of an 
article co-written by Ghana’s former Minister for Lands and Forestry and a 
leading law professor, “the only viable option” for land administration 
because the state system is even more “expensive, tortuous and corrupt. . . . 
However, the indigenous system cannot sustain itself in urban and peri-
urban areas without drastic overhaul.”196 The following discussion 
suggests ways in which such an overhaul can be achieved through better 
integration of customary and statutory land authorities. 
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A.   Customary Land Boards: Giving Shape to Customary-Statutory 
Partnership 
Land administration in Ghana is fundamentally a local issue, and a 
large majority of Ghanaians call for more local power.197 To meet this 
demand, government and customary authorities should work together to 
modify customary land management groups, where they exist, into a 
system of Customary Land Boards. The Boards should include a wide 
variety of stakeholders, combining customary and state administration. By 
adding more technical and administrative expertise to the popular, 
entrenched land authority of the chiefs, such Land Boards would be better 
placed than any current institutions to deal with the complex and 
overlapping rights, issues, and disputes that characterize the Ghanaian 
land sector. And by regularizing administration and providing a more 
stable land administration structure, they would facilitate customary-
government partnerships. 
Land Boards should include the allodial titleholders—whether they be 
chiefs, family heads, tendamba, or other individuals or groups—as well as 
elders, councilors or other traditional advisors. They should also include 
professionals such as surveyors and lawyers whose expertise could 
improve the documentation and formalization of customary land 
administration, and thus make it easier for customary rights to be 
recognized in state law. Representation from women’s or migrants’ groups 
would help guarantee that their rights are not ignored in this process. 
Partnerships would also need to be maintained with land sector agencies, 
including the Office of Stool Land Administration, the Lands Commission, 
and the Department of Town and Country Planning, but since each of 
these bodies has had its local-level functions taken over by the District 
Assemblies under Ghana’s recent decentralization plan, establishing 
effective links with the Assemblies would be most important. 
Despite these general outlines, Customary Land Boards would 
necessarily vary in structure from area to area. Boards would look different 
in areas with powerful and centralized tribes than in areas with no 
tradition of a strong chief, or where the chieftaincy’s power has waned. 
One prominent example in Ghana comes from the Ashanti region, where 
the Asantehene—revered head of the most powerful tribe in Ghana—has 
forged a robust partnership with the government. The Asantehene’s power 
is greater than that of any other Ghanaian chief, and he has employed it in 
part to maintain order in the Ashanti land sector through the use of a 
thriving Lands Secretariat where all land transactions and documentation 
throughout the paramountcy must receive consent and concurrence to be 
valid. Customarily, one-third of the revenue from customary land 
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transactions within the Ashanti region is given to the Asantehene, who has 
a good record of spending it on community development projects such as 
schools, roads, water, electricity, and other projects.198 Accordingly, the 
Asantehene has always played an important role in land administration in 
the region, and cooperation between his Land Secretariat and the 
government has proven both necessary and fruitful. In other regions, 
however, no comparable customary authority exists, and Boards in these 
areas would have to incorporate family heads, tendamba, or other allodial 
titleholders. 
The village of Gbawe, situated just west of Accra in the Greater Accra 
Region, has drawn much attention for the success of its custom-based land 
management system.199 Kasanga and Kotey attribute Gbawe’s success to its 
use of lawyers and surveyors, payment of due compensation to families 
and individuals who lose land, women’s involvement in land 
management, and the collaboration between the chief, elders, and public 
land agencies.200 Successful local-level land administration bodies have 
been set up in other African nations, most notably in Botswana.201 None of 
those nations, however, has had customary land authorities as strong as 
the Ghanaian chieftaincy. Land management is inevitably a task that 
requires administrative ability, a quality that is not among those for which 
chiefs are generally selected. Consequently, many, if not most, Ghanaian 
chiefs are uninterested in the paperwork and record-keeping that are 
increasingly necessary for adequate local land administration. Many chiefs 
recognize this fact, and have proven amenable to and even eager for the 
participation of professionals to aid in the more technical aspects of land 
administration.  
Since they would include representatives of all the main land sector 
actors and agencies, Land Boards would have wide influence over land 
administration at the local level. Generally, the Boards would grant the 
same customary rights that are currently granted by chiefs and would act 
only with chiefs’ cooperation, but would be able to record those allocations 
in written form (thus facilitating their registration). This would help 
provide the “formalization” desired by many property theorists without 
threatening the legitimacy and efficiency of the customary sector. 
Customary Land Boards would be compelled to file inventories of the land 
they administer and the funds they disperse, a task that would be greatly 
facilitated by the presence of lawyers on the Boards. This requirement 
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would also make the Boards more transparent and accountable, and thus 
help obviate the need for overriding state administration of stool lands. 
Of course, if such Boards did not prove politically feasible, Ghana 
could imitate one of the other localized customary-statutory management 
systems tried in other parts of Africa. One approach, undertaken in 
Mozambique and proposed in Tanzania, includes a relatively simple 
measurement and demarcation of village-level boundaries and the 
granting of rights and responsibilities for that land to a village body.202 The 
gestion du terroir (“village lands management”) approach employed in parts 
of West Africa is slightly different in that it grants villagers responsibility 
for land management and use, but retains the government’s formal powers 
to control access.203 
B.  Title Registration 
Title registration has been at the heart of land tenure reform attempts 
in Ghana, as in many other African nations. But despite registration’s 
importance and the obvious impact it has on customary systems,204 the 
government has not made nearly enough effort to partner with traditional 
authorities in carrying it out.  Land title registration in Ghana currently 
extends only to a few districts, and covers a very small proportion of the 
country. If it ever spreads, customary authorities could play a role in its 
success.205 Without their participation, it will almost certainly continue to 
fail, as it has throughout Africa.206 The existence of competing land tenure 
systems can exacerbate existing uncertainty and insecurity, undermining 
expensive titling programs.207 
The register must recognize customary regimes if it truly aims to 
provide a stable record of all rights in land. Unfortunately, land title 
registration has been used across Africa to replace customary systems by 
making a register the only legal evidence of title. If title registration in 
Ghana follows this trend, it will remain an unreliable record of land rights, 
“since customary land law, the common law of contract and rules of equity 
have not been jettisoned, [and thus] enforceable rights in land may still 
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exist outside the register.”208 Under Ghana’s 1986 Land Title Registration 
Law, most customary rights are theoretically registerable,209 but transfers of 
registered land can only be effective if they are conducted through entries 
in the register. Currently, chiefs and their subjects perceive few reasons to 
participate in titling, and consequently tend to ignore the system in 
preference for traditional tenure protection mechanisms. Thus, “[i]t is rare 
for an indigenous resident of a community to seek registration, since under 
both statutory law and traditional custom the tenure of an indigenous 
person is assured.”210 The Land Title Registration Law recognizes the 
validity of some of these rights by classifying them as “overriding 
interests” that retain their strength even if they are not registered.211 The 
protection of overriding interests is not a good long-term solution, 
however, because their existence devalues the protection given by 
registration and causes massive problems for conveyancers. 
Customary authorities must be made part of the solution. Titling in 
any area should thus begin with the determination and registration of the 
allodial titles—in most cases meaning the titles held by chiefs—only then 
moving on to other interests. The rights entered on the register on behalf of 
the allodial titleholder should be limited to recognition of this 
administrative authority. Registering the allodial interest with even this 
limited power is important, as it will help convince chiefs of the security of 
their authority and thus facilitate the move to improve their management 
functions even while the power of their legal ownership declines. 
At the same time, more customary rights must be brought onto the 
register, for example by a push to register sharecropping tenancies and 
derived rights arrangements. Furthermore, though the land title 
registration law provides for the registration of land in the name of a stool 
or family, it does not require registration of the customary management 
committee with responsibility and authority over that land.212 Failure to 
register the appropriate management committee makes it harder for a 
potential buyer to discover the appropriate person or persons with whom 
he should transact. Rights and boundaries themselves might be more 
accurately recorded if parcel registration did more to adopt a participatory, 
on-the-ground approach. Woodman describes a similar system of 
customary boundary demarcation that involves the participation of 
neighboring landowners, a practice intended to discourage future land 
disputes.213 Ghana’s neighbor Côte d’Ivoire has made this customary-style 
approach the basis of its registration process. 
Above all, the government must acknowledge that titling is not an 
exercise whose cost will justify its benefits in all areas of Ghana. Where 
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titling does make sense, however—such as in Accra, where government 
machinery is already active—it must take better account of customary law 
and authorities. The main goal of this customary influence would be to 
make the law more accessible to the average landowner. Similarly, the 
government should stress education programs, focusing on the process, 
requirements, and benefits of titling. Thus far, the registration program 
makes little provision for effectively reaching its audience, even in the 
process of registration itself. The only publicity required for a person 
applying for title is to place an advertisement in one of Ghana’s weekly 
newspapers. There is little chance that this method of publication will 
reach any but a few careful readers.214 Unless land title registration reform 
begins to draw on the strengths of existing customary institutions, it will 
likely remain as ineffective as those newspaper announcements. 
C.  Dispute Resolution 
A third area in which traditional authorities play a particularly 
valuable role in land administration is in the resolution of land disputes, an 
area in which the government desperately needs help.215 In colonial Ghana, 
the policy of recognizing customary law but not giving strength to 
customary authority led to insecurity, and inadvertently but severely 
hampered economic growth: 
 
Capitalism failed [in colonial Ghana] because the institutions of 
indirect rule compelled indigenous actors to enforce property 
rights at the local level, even as they denied most of those actors 
the coercive force needed to resolve conflict over the definition of 
those rights. Throughout Africa, therefore, conflict over custom 
went unchecked, customary law remained fluid, and property 
rights were insecure. That insecurity, not the maintenance of 
customary law, blocked capitalism’s expansion.216 
Moreover, the specific characteristics of land litigation make it particularly 
amenable to customary resolution. 
Customary dispute resolution varies as much as customary law itself, 
but its rules generally incorporate both respect for tradition and concern 
for efficiency.217 In most customary tribunals, chiefs or elders conduct some 
sort of hearing, which is often public and involves a wide variety of 
interested parties, including tenants, neighbors, and secondary rights-
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holders.218 Rules of procedure in these hearings are not as well-defined or 
as strict as they are in most state court systems, and the focus is on finding 
truth and reaching reconciliation rather than enforcing penalties or 
assigning blame. In part, this is necessarily so, since chiefly courts in 
contemporary Ghana lack state-backed power to compel attendance or 
enforce decisions in property disputes.219 
Nevertheless, it is a testament to the comparative advantage of 
customary arbitration220 that despite this restriction customary tribunals 
remain the dominant dispute resolution body in Ghana.221 One recent 
study reported that in the private land market, chiefs and elders were the 
most common adjudicators of reported land conflicts, more than twice as 
popular as courts or land administrators.222 Approximately ninety percent 
of respondents claimed to be happy with the final outcome.223 In Kumasi, 
for example, the Asantehene in 1999 authorized all land disputes in the 
Kumasi Traditional Council area to be withdrawn from the courts and 
settled instead by traditional methods. Many disputants responded almost 
immediately, and several long-standing disputes were quickly resolved.224 
Ghanaian courts could encourage customary resolution by suggesting to 
litigants that their land disputes might be better resolved in customary 
courts. Other African countries have already done this: Recognizing the 
important role played by traditional authorities in dispute resolution, 
Uganda’s Land Act 1998 explicitly allows traditional authorities to serve as 
mediators, and even allows the state-run Land Tribunals to, at any time 
during a case, advise the parties that they might be better served by such 
mediation.225 
Local adjudication mechanisms are validated further by the fact that 
most land conflicts arise at the local level, where the force of social 
sanctions—the stock in trade of customary dispute resolution—is strongest 
and the parties often share an understanding of customary rules. 
Moreover, customary dispute-settlement bodies can eventually help 
develop a customary common law through their decisions, blending local 
and national practice.226 
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 CONCLUSION 
The argument presented in this Note, though very specific in its focus, 
has much broader implications for studies of law and development 
generally. Though cynical about states’ ability to swiftly change 
fundamental property relations, the argument here does not imply that 
African states have no role to play in making property rights regimes more 
efficient. As the example of Ghana demonstrates, states can indeed do so 
by unearthing the property arrangements emerging in practice, 
recognizing them and facilitating change without attempting to direct it 
from above. The preceding discussion also highlights the dependence of 
property rights systems on the legitimacy of the social agreements 
underpinning them, an issue explored in deeper detail by New 
Institutional Economics theorists. The treatment of property rights as an 
economic and social institution remains perhaps the most important 
application of NIE theory, and further discussion of how those institutions 
evolve to balance economic and social concerns could be very fruitful, 
particularly in relation to states with a dualistic legal regime such as 
Ghana’s. Research into these areas may prove helpful in addressing 
development issues, but, like the present discussion, it is unlikely to offer a 
simple remedy to land sector problems. Policy proposals that rely on a 
single, silver bullet solution—land title registration being only the most 
obvious example—are likely to flounder, just as they have in Africa for the 
past fifty years. Land sector problems are too complicated, and their 
solutions too nuanced, for any simplistic, state-driven reform to work. 
 
